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How Far Is Too Far?
THE PROPER FRAMEWORK FOR CIVIL REMEDIES
AGAINST FACILITATORS OF TERRORISM
INTRODUCTION
Perhaps no single issue in recent history has galvanized a
greater governmental response than the fight against terrorism.
Prior to 1992, that fight from a judicial standpoint was limited to
criminal claims brought by the U.S. government against
individuals and groups directly responsible for carrying out
terrorist acts against Americans.1 Since then, new events and new
understandings of the nature of terrorism have triggered several
expansions in the anti-terrorism statutes, most notably the
addition of a civil remedy and the extension of criminal liability to
include those who provide material support to terrorists.2
Since the introduction of these two provisions, courts
have struggled to determine the elements of the civil cause of
action under 18 U.S.C. § 2333 and how far such civil liability
extends.3 These issues have arisen primarily in cases in which
terrorist victims have sued financial institutions or other
organizations that allegedly provided money to the terrorists
who caused their injuries.4 While initially hesitant to extend
civil liability beyond those directly involved in the attack,5 courts
have recently allowed claims against indirect financiers through
a variety of theories and with little consistency in terms of the
elements required for a successful claim.6 In response, other
courts and scholars have pushed back against this expansion,
arguing that it violates general tort requirements and the intent

See 18 U.S.C. § 2332 (2012).
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2333, 2339A, 2339B, 2339C; see also Gill v. Arab Bank
PLC., 893 F. Supp. 2d 474, 493 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (discussing history of statute).
3 See Gill, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 483 (“Much of the relevant law is unsettled.”)
4 See, e.g., id.; Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. (Boim I), 291 F.3d 1000 (7th
Cir. 2002).
5 See, e.g., Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1011.
6 See Gill, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 483 (describing different approaches courts
have taken).
1
2
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of Congress that the statute reach only those directly involved in
the commission of a terrorist attack.7
This note will argue for a middle ground between the
two extreme ends of this argument, expanding civil liability
beyond those directly involved in the attack, but limiting it to
only those facilitators whose material support proximately
caused a plaintiff’s injuries. Expanding liability beyond the
principle actors is the best, and perhaps the only, way to
effectively go after terrorist organizations. In virtually all cases,
the primary actors are exceedingly difficult to find and have
little if any attachable assets, meaning that limiting the civil
remedy to these individuals would rarely, if ever, provide an
actual remedy to a victim. On the other end, allowing suits
against individuals and groups who fund terrorist activity will
not only provide the victim with a chance to recover actual
damages, it will go a long way toward disrupting the activities
of terrorist groups.
Part I will examine the creation of the civil remedy, trace
the remedy’s expansion through a series of Seventh Circuit
decisions, and then consider corresponding push-back and
criticism to the expansion. Part II will look at approaches other
courts have taken. Part III will argue that legislative history,
the plain language of the statute, and policy considerations all
support expanding liability beyond the principal actors. Part IV
will first argue that the requirement of proximate cause will
sufficiently limit the scope of liability and, second, will propose a
framework by which to determine when material support has
proximately caused plaintiff’s injuries.
I.

CREATION OF REMEDY AND EXPANSION IN THE BOIM
CASES

The provisions of § 2333 were initially enacted to
provide victims of international terrorism a way to bring suit
against the foreign individuals or groups who carried out the
attack, who previously were beyond the jurisdictional reach of
American courts. Eventually, courts expanded the statute to
reach not only those who directly carried out the attack, but
those who provided assistance to these groups.

7 See, e.g., Geoffrey Sant, So Banks Are Terrorists Now?: The Misuse of the
Civil Suit Provision of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 533, 580-81 (2013).
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Creation of Civil Remedy

Congress adopted the current version of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2333 on October 29, 1992, as part of the Federal Courts
Administrative Act of 1992.8 Section 2333 reads in part:
Any national of the United States injured in his or her person,
property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism,
or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor in any
appropriate district court of the United States and shall recover
threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit,
including attorney’s fees.9

The provision was largely a response to two terrorist
attacks that occurred in the 1980s that highlighted gaps in the
jurisdictional authority of U.S. courts. The first incident
occurred in 1985, when terrorists hijacked a cruise ship
travelling through the Mediterranean Sea and killed Leon
Klinghoffer, an American citizen.10 Klinghoffer’s widow and
other victims of the cruise ship hijacking brought suit against,
among others, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO),
which was allegedly responsible for the attack.11 Following a
lengthy battle over jurisdiction, the court eventually allowed
the claim against the PLO to proceed, because it determined
that it fell within certain admiralty-related provisions of
federal jurisdiction.12 When Congress introduced Section 2333,
it recognized that had the attack not occurred at sea, Ms.
Klinghoffer would likely be without a remedy, noting that “a
similar attack occurring on an airplane or in some other locale
might not have been subject to civil action in the U.S.”13
Further, as reflected in the testimony of Klinghoffer’s daughter
to Congress during hearings on Section 2333, following the
initial favorable ruling on subject-matter jurisdiction, the
8 See Federal Courts Administration Act, Pub. L. No. 102-572, 106 Stat 4506
(Oct. 29, 1992). The statute actually has a somewhat complicated legislative history. It
was first introduced as the Civil Remedies for Victims of Terrorism Act by Senator
Charles Grassley in 1990, and incorporated into the Military Construction
Appropriations Act of 1991. See Military Construction Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.
101-519, 104 Stat 2240 (Nov. 5, 1991). The bill was repealed in 1991, then reintroduced
and re-adopted in 1992. See id.
9 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (2012).
10 See H.R. REP. No. 102-1040, at 5 (1992) (“The recent case of the Klinghoffer
family is an example of this gap in our efforts to develop a comprehensive legal
response to international terrorism.”).
11 See Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 739 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1990),
vacated on other grounds, 937 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1991).
12 See id., at 858-59.
13 H.R. REP. 102-1040, at 5.
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family became embroiled in a long and costly fight to secure
personal jurisdiction over the PLO, eventually settling more
than a decade after the original incident.14
The second attack that spurred the creation of the civil
remedy occurred in 1988, when two Libyan terrorists smuggled
a bomb onto a Pan Am flight that exploded over Scotland, killing
270 people.15 The victims’ families were eventually able to secure
a judgment against Pan Am for willful misconduct in allowing
the bomb onto the plane.16 Still, the families faced numerous
hurdles in trying to bring a suit against the terrorists
responsible for the attack. Notably, even after the two smugglers
were identified and indicted by a federal grand jury, Libya
refused to turn the men over to U.S. authorities to stand trial.17
Together, these two incidents provided the impetus for
reform. Congress eventually passed Section 2333’s civil remedy
to ensure that terrorist attack victims and their families could
file suit in U.S. courts and have a remedy available to them for
injuries stemming from those acts of terrorism.18
B.

Boim I

It was not until 2002, ten years after Section 2333 first
became law, that it was first addressed by the courts in a series
of cases in the Seventh Circuit arising from the killing of David
Boim, a dual American and Israeli citizen, by members of
Hamas in Israel in 1996.19 Boim’s parents brought suit under
Section 2333 against Hamas and the two identified Hamas
members who carried out the attack.20 They also named as
defendants two American nonprofit organizations, Quiranic
Literary Institute (QLI) and Holy Land Foundation (HLF). QLI
was an Illinois organization engaged in translating sacred
Islamic texts.21 HLF was a Texas group that raised money for
14 Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990: Hearing on S. 2465 Before the Subcomm. On
Courts & Admin. Practice of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 56-57 (1991)
[hereinafter Anti-Terrorism Hearing] (statement of Lisa Klinghoffer).
15 David Treadwell, Pan Am Guilty of ‘Willful Misconduct’: Verdict: Jury
Finds Airline, now Defunct, to be Negligent in the Lockerbie Bombing that Claimed 270
Lives. Victims’ Families can now Seek Further Damages, L.A. TIMES (July 11, 1992),
http://articles.latimes.com/1992-07-11/news/mn-1480_1_willful-misconduct.
16 Id.
17 Treadwell, supra note 15.
18 See infra Part III.A
19 Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. (Boim I), 291 F.3d 1000, 1002, 1009 (7th
Cir. 2002) (“No court has yet considered the meaning or scope of section[ ] . . . 2333,
and so we write upon a tabula rasa.”).
20 Id. at 1004.
21 Id. at 1003.
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humanitarian relief efforts.22 According to the Boims, the
groups were also fronts for Hamas, raising and funneling money
for the terrorist group in support of its terrorist activities.23 In
Boim I, QLI and HLF moved to dismiss the case for failure to
state a claim, arguing that Section 2333 did not provide a cause
of action beyond those directly involved in the attack.24 In
response, the Boims put forth three theories for establishing
their claim against QLI and HLF: (1) Donating money to Hamas
satisfies § 2331’s definition of international terrorism; (2)
Section 2333 incorporates into the civil remedy the criminal
material support provisions of §§ 2339A, 2339B and 2339C,
which criminalizes the provision of material support, including
monetary support, to terrorist groups; and (3) Section 2333
provides for civil aiding and abetting liability.25 The district
court denied the motion to dismiss, rejecting Boim’s first theory
but accepting their second and third theories.26
The Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court on
the first theory, that solely providing money to Hamas, without
more, did not constitute “international terrorism” under
§ 2333.27 Section 2333 defines international terrorism, by
reference to § 2331, as activities that “involve violent acts or
acts dangerous to human life,” appear intended to intimidate or
coerce, and occur primarily outside of the United States.28 The
Seventh Circuit in Boim I decided that merely providing money
to a terrorist group did not constitute a violent act or act
dangerous to human life, concluding that to label such activity
as terrorism would give § 2333 “an almost unlimited reach.”29
The Seventh Circuit also accepted Boim’s second theory,
that § 2333 incorporated §§ 2339A and 2339B, which
criminalize the provision of material support to terrorist groups
and terrorist activity.30 Section 2339A makes it a crime to
provide material support, including furnishing money or
financial services, with the intention that the support be used
to facilitate terrorist activity.31 Section 2339B criminalizes the
provision of support to known terrorist groups, regardless of
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Id.
Id. at 1004.
Id.
Id. at 1005.
Id. at 1005-06.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(A) (2012).
Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1009.
Id. at 1012, 1015; 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B.
18 U.S.C. § 2339A.
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whether the donor intends that the support be used to facilitate
terrorist activity.32 The Seventh Circuit concluded that because
Congress chose to impose criminal liability for such behavior,
they must have intended to impose civil liability as well.33
Finally, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the district
court that § 2333 provided for civil aiding and abetting liability.
In opposing this theory, QLI and HLF noted that the Supreme
Court in Central Bank of Denver N.A. v. First Interstate Bank
of Denver held that civil aiding and abetting liability is only
available where the specific statute expressly provided for it.34
The Seventh Circuit held that Central Bank did not apply to
§ 2333 for four reasons. First, Central Bank involved an
implied civil cause of action (the SEC’s provision against
securities fraud does not contain an express civil cause of
action, but one has been implied by the courts), while § 2333
involved an express civil cause of action.35 Second, based on the
legislative history, the court concluded that Congress intended
§ 2333 to include general tort principles, including aiding and
abetting liability.36 Third, the court concluded, based on the
legislative history and the language of the statute, that
Congress intended that civil liability in § 2333 to be at least as
extensive as the criminal liability provided for under §§ 2339A
and 2339B.37 Specifically, the court pointed to the phrase
“involve . . . acts dangerous to human life” in the definition of
international terrorism in concluding that such broad language
necessarily showed Congress’s intent to impute all avenues of
traditional criminal and civil liability into the anti-terrorism
provisions.38 Aiding and abetting, the court concluded, was both
well-ingrained in traditional notions of tort law and, in the
context of facilitating terrorist activity, was clearly an activity
that “involve[d] acts dangerous to human life.”39 Finally, again
pointing to language from the legislative history, the court
concluded that in passing § 2333, Congress intended to go after
the funding of terrorist group and that disallowing aiding and
32 18 U.S.C. § 2339B; see also Gill v. Arab Bank PLC., 893 F. Supp. 2d 474,
504 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
33 Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1019.
34 See id. at 1005; see also Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 165 (1994) (holding that Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 does not provide a private right of action for aiding and abetting).
35 Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1019.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 1015.
39 Id. at 1020.
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abetting liability would thwart that effort.40 The court then
went on to explain the elements of an aiding and abetting
cause of action, pointing to Halberstam v. Welch, in which the
Supreme Court set out the elements of civil aiding and abetting
liability.41 Under this framework, one is liable where they
provide “substantial assistance” to another in accomplishing a
tortious act.42
Thus, in the first instance of a court encountering the
§ 2333 civil cause of action, the Boim I court allowed a Hamas
victim’s survivors to bring a civil claim against two alleged
Hamas donors on two separate theories: (1) primary liability,
by concluding that the civil claim incorporated the material
support activities included in the criminal provisions; and (2)
secondary liability, by concluding that the civil claim includes
aiding and abetting liability.
C.

Boim II, Boim III, and Criticism

Following the ruling in Boim I, affirming the denial of
the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the case returned to the
district court. In 2004, the district court granted summary
judgment to the plaintiff against all defendants except QLI.43
The court concluded that plaintiffs satisfied the elements for
aiding and abetting liability against HLF: (1) David Boim was
killed by an attack carried out by Hamas, and (2) HLF provided
material support to Hamas knowing that Hamas was engaged
in terrorist activities.44 The Seventh Circuit reversed and
remanded in 2007 (Boim II).45 In Boim II, the Seventh Circuit
reiterated its holding that aiding and abetting was available
under § 2333.46 However, it concluded that even in such
secondary liability cases, there must be a showing of causation,
requiring the plaintiff’s injuries to be a foreseeable
consequence of the defendant’s contributions to Hamas.47 In
this case, the court concluded it was not sufficiently foreseeable
Id. at 1019.
See id. at 1012 (citing Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
42 Id.
43 Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 340 F. Supp. 2d 885, 931 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
44 Id. The second element was satisfied by collateral estoppel, as the D.C.
Circuit had previously affirmed a criminal conviction against HLF for materially
supporting Hamas. Id.
45 Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. (Boim II), 511 F.3d 707 (7th Cir.
2007) (order vacating judgment); see also Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev.
(Boim III), 549 F.3d 685, 688 (7th Cir. 2008) (discussing findings of the Boim II court).
46 See Boim III, 549 F.3d at 688.
47 Id. at 692.
40
41
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that HLF’s procurement of funds and other support to Hamas
would result in plaintiff’s injuries.48
Plaintiffs petitioned for and received rehearing by the
Seventh Circuit en banc (Boim III).49 In Boim III, the Seventh
Circuit reversed course in several key respects, eliminating
aiding and abetting liability, but arguably expanding the reach
of § 2333. First, the court reversed its Boim I holding as to
aiding and abetting liability, concluding that Central Bank
controlled, and thus Congress’s silence meant there was no
aiding and abetting liability.50 Further, the court reasoned that
to allow aiding and abetting liability would expand “the federal
courts’ extraterritorial jurisdiction,” a power that is reserved to
Congress.51 After rejecting aiding and abetting liability, the
court turned to the elements required for a primary liability
through incorporation claim. While the court concluded that
causation is required, it rejected the Boim II holding that
causation—both cause in fact and proximate cause—was
lacking as to HLF.52
On the issue of cause in fact, the court equated the case
with the multiple fires example from torts. The multiple fires
example involves two fires simultaneously converging to burn
down a building.53 Because the fires converged, it is impossible
to determine which fire caused the building to burn down. In
such cases, the analysis shifts from whether each individual
event caused the result to whether each event was a
substantial factor in bringing about the result.54 The court
reasoned that although it was impossible to determine whether
an individual monetary donation to a terrorist group caused
the attack, the requirement of but-for causation would be
relaxed to avoid a situation in which an injured party was
without a remedy.55
On the issue of proximate cause, the court rejected the
Boim II conclusion that the plaintiff’s injury was not a
foreseeable result of HLF’s support.56 “Giving money to Hamas,”
knowing the nature of its activities, the court reasoned, was

48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

Id. at 698-700.
Id. at 688.
Id. at 689.
Id. at 689-90.
Id. at 690-92.
Id. at 695-97.
Id. at 697.
Id.
Id. at 698.
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analogous to “giving a loaded gun to a child.”57 That is, just as it
would be reasonably foreseeable that giving a gun to a child
would result in the child or someone else being shot, it is
reasonably foreseeable that giving money to Hamas would lead
to a terrorist act resulting in injury. The court remanded the
case as to HLF to determine whether there was causation in this
case, as the lower court had not even addressed the subject in its
original summary judgment decision.58
The dissent in Boim III criticized the holding in several
respects. First, it argued that the majority’s new conception of
causation in these cases—essentially that any financial
contribution to a terrorist group was a cause of a subsequent
attack by that group—effectively eliminated a causation
requirement.59 Second, the court noted that by treating the case
as one of primary rather than secondary liability, it eliminated
the need to show that the defendants intended that their
support would be used to facilitate terrorist activity.60 As in this
case, recklessness would now be sufficient; a donor who knew or
should have known the nature of the organization could be held
liable. Taken together, the dissent concluded, “[t]his sweeping
rule of liability leaves no role for the factfinder to distinguish
between those individuals and organizations who directly and
purposely finance terrorism from those who are many steps
removed from terrorist activity and whose aid has, at most, an
indirect, uncertain, and unintended effect on terrorist activity.”61
In the case of HLF, the dissent concluded, there was a genuine
issue whether it knew or intended that its donations to various
alleged Hamas front charities would in fact be used to facilitate
Hamas’s terrorist activity.62 The dissent envisioned liability for a
potentially endless array of groups and individuals, including
groups who host Hamas speakers at their conventions or publish
sympathetic editorials.63 At some point, the dissent argued, “the
harm is simply too remote from the original tortious act to
justify holding the actor responsible for it.”64 Finally, and
relatedly, the dissent argues that the majority’s holding would
expose a donor to potentially endless liability, as one who gives
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

Id. at 690.
Id. at 701.
Id. at 705 (Rovner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 707.
Id. at 705.
Id. at 706.
Id.
Id. at 724.
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money to Hamas in 2000 could theoretically be held
perpetually liable for any subsequent Hamas attacks.65
D.

Sant’s Criticism

Geoffrey Sant, a professor at Fordham Law School,
advances two primary criticisms of Boim III and other court
decisions that allowed claims to proceed against banks under
§ 2333, namely that (1) providing financial support does not fall
within the meaning of “international terrorism,” as defined by
§ 2331; and (2) that the legislative history supports a more
narrow reading of § 2333.
First, Sant argues that the term “international
terrorism” in § 2333 and its definition in § 2331 as an activity
that “involves acts dangerous to human life” does not include
the furnishing of money or financial services.66 He points to
Stutts v. De Dietrich Group, one of the earliest known § 2333
decision involving a bank.67 In Stutts, a group of former
military members exposed to toxic gas while deployed in Iraq
brought suit against De Dietrich Group, a bank that issued
letters of credit to alleged producers and suppliers of the sarin
gas used against the injured plaintiffs.68 The court referenced
the decision in Boim I—which held that funding by itself did
not constitute international terrorism—in concluding that
merely issuing letters of credit similarly did not constitute “an
act dangerous to human life” as required by the international
terrorism definition.69 Sant reasons that it is hard to envision
corporate bankers acting in their normal business duties as
fitting into the conception of international terrorists.70
Sant’s second argument is that Congress intended
§ 2333 to be a jurisdictional and largely symbolic provision
with limited reach, specifically targeting the terrorist actors
themselves and providing actual relief in only the very small
number of cases where these terrorist groups have attachable
assets in the United States.71 Sant first points to several
examples from the legislative history that he says
demonstrates that Congress adopted the civil remedy as a
Id.
See Sant, supra note 7, at 579.
67 Id. at 579; Stutts v. De Dietrich Grp., No. 03-CV-4058, 2006 WL 1867060,
at *1 (E.D.N.Y. June 30, 2006).
68 Stutts, 2006 WL 1867060, at *1.
69 Id. at *2-*3.
70 Sant, supra note 7, at 539.
71 Id. at 549.
65
66
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purely jurisdictional provision. Sant focuses on the Klinghoffer
and Pan Am cases, which were the impetus behind the
adoption of § 2333.72 First, he notes that the main issue in the
Klinghoffer case, was the court’s inability, but for certain
admiralty provisions, to secure personal jurisdiction over a
terrorist group with no contacts with the United States73 The
civil remedy, Sant argues, was created as a way to close this
jurisdictional loophole, which would allow terrorist victims to
sue their attacker if the attack occurred at sea but not on land
or in an airplane.74 Sant focuses on testimony given by Joseph
Morris, the president of the Lincoln Legal Foundation, during a
subcommittee hearing on the civil remedy, where he
emphasized that § 2333’s purpose was to redress jurisdictional
issues.75 Morris testified that
Victims who have attempted to sue terrorists have encountered
numerous jurisdictional hurdles and have found the courts reluctant
to intrude in the absence of clear statutory mandates showing them
what their jurisdictional boundaries are76 . . . . Whereas that
[Klinghoffer] opinion rested on the special nature of our admiralty
laws, this bill will provide general jurisdiction to our federal courts
and a cause of action for cases where an American has been injured
by an act of terrorism overseas.77

Sant also cites to testimony by Lisa Klinghoffer, the victim’s
daughter, who testified that “it’s taken our family [four and a
half] years to give us the right to sue the PLO. We are
hoping that other families in the future won’t have to go through
the years that we have gone through. They will have
that . . . right.”78
Sant then points to examples from the legislative
history that he contends shows Congress’s intent to limit the
§ 2333 civil remedy to the terrorist actors directly involved in
carrying out the attacks. For example, he points to testimony
by the chairmen of a group representing the victims of the Pan
Am attack, who did not mention third-party actors, instead
stating that the civil remedy “would permit victims of terrorism
to file civil actions against terrorists and terrorist
See id.; see also supra Part I.A.
Sant, supra note 7, at 541.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 541-42.
76 Anti-Terrorism Hearing, supra note 14, at 78 (statement of Joseph Morris,
President, Lincoln Legal Foundation).
77 Id. at 17.
78 Id. at 75 (statement of Lisa Klinghoffer).
72

73
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organizations.”79 Sant also points out that the victims of the
Klinghoffer and Pan Am cases, the cases that triggered § 2333,
were able to secure monetary relief against third parties such
as the airline and cruise operator, and that the families sought
the civil remedy as a way to sue the actual perpetrators and
either get money (if the terrorist group could be found and had
assets in the United States), or, more likely, some sort of moral
vindication or sense of justice.80 As Sant notes, Lisa Klinghoffer
seems to suggest as much in her testimony before Congress: “If
one such as Abu Abbas [the mastermind of the attack that
killed her father] or his agents can be found within our borders,
he could be made to answer for his deeds.”81 Sant further points
to statements by Senator Grassley, the sponsor of the bill, that
“[T]his bill provides victims with the tools necessary to find
terrorists’ assets and seize them,” which suggests he was
focused on instances where a terrorist group itself may have
assets in the United States.82
Sant argues there are several factors that have led
judges to assume an activist role in these cases, ignoring
Congressional intent and contorting the definition of
international terrorism in order to include the activities of
banking defendants. These include the horrendous nature of
terrorist acts, the desire to punish terrorist groups, the
overwhelmingly sympathetic nature of the victims, and the
desire to provide victims with a financial remedy.83 These
sentiments are reflected in the decision of courts. Sant notes, for
instance, that the Boim II opinion contains references to David
Boim’s “trademark hug and smile.” He further contends that in
most murder cases, judges do not make these kind of sympathyinducing references to victims, but rather only refer to victims to
explain the circumstances of the death or in reference to other
more factual information. Sant perceives this as evidence of
judges’ particular susceptibility to sympathy in these cases.84
Sant also focuses at length on a particular sentence in
the Boim III opinion. After concluding that § 2333 does not
provide for aiding and abetting liability, the court goes on to
say that “an alternative and more promising ground for
bringing donors . . . within the grasp of section 2333” would be
79
80
81
82
83
84

Sant, supra note 7, at 544 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 546.
Anti-Terrorism Hearing, supra note 14, at 59, 62.
Sant, supra note 7, at 545 (emphasis in original).
See id. at 535.
See id. at 536, 557.
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the primary liability through incorporation theory.85 Sant calls
this “a remarkable and seemingly revealing passage,”
suggesting that the “more promising” language shows that “the
court may have been searching for a means of reaching a
predetermined result.”86 As Sant notes, the dissent in Boim III
also quotes this language.87 The dissent begins its opinion by
noting that, “[t]he murder of David Boim was an unspeakably
brutal and senseless act, and I can only imagine the pain it has
caused his parents.” The dissent goes on to describe terrorism as a
“scourge” before qualifying that, “it is [the court’s] responsibility
to ask whether [terrorism] presents so unique a threat as to
justify the abandonment of” the causation requirement and to
justify the other deficiencies in the majority opinion.88
II.

APPROACHES FOLLOWING THE BOIM DECISIONS

Bolstered by the ruling in Boim I, § 2333 became the
basis for a number of new lawsuits, primarily aimed at financial
institutions with alleged ties to terrorist groups. While some
courts adopted, and even expanded, the Boim I approach, other
courts pushed back.
A.

Courts Embracing the Boim I Approach

In 2004, two years after Boim I, the families of several
Americans killed in a purported Hamas terrorist attack in
Israel in 2000 brought suit in New York against Arab Bank
P.L.C.89 Arab Bank is one of the largest financial institutions in
the Middle East.90 It is headquartered in Jordan and does
business all over the world.91 According to the plaintiffs in
Linde v. Arab Bank P.L.C., Arab Bank maintained accounts for
several groups and individuals it knew were fronts for Hamas,
and that Hamas utilized these accounts to fund its terrorist
activities.92 The plaintiffs further alleged that Arab Bank was
the administrator of a “universal death and dismemberment
85 Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. (Boim III), 549 F.3d 685, 690
(7th Cir. 2008).
86 Sant, supra note 7.
87 Id.
88 Boim III, 549 F.3d at 705 (Rovner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
89 Linde v. Arab Bank, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 575-76 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
90 Arab
Bank, Our Profile (2013), http://www.arabbank.com/en/profile.
aspx?CSRT=2366691262021416800.
91 Id.
92 Linde, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 578.
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plan,” through which families of Hamas agents killed or
injured received a cash payment.93 According to the plaintiffs,
Hamas provided the bank with a list of eligible individuals,
who then provided the bank with the necessary certificates and
received payment.94 The plaintiffs alleged that the maintenance
of accounts and the handling of the payment plan facilitated
and encouraged Hamas’s terrorist activity, and they sought to
hold them secondarily liable for the victims’ injuries, relying on
Boim I.95 The district court, in denying Arab Bank’s motion to
dismiss, relied on the language and reasoning of Boim I,
concluding that § 2333 allows for aiding and abetting liability.96
The court further held that § 2333 allows for civil conspiracy
liability, which was never addressed in Boim I. The court
reasoned that the criminal portions of the act included
conspiracy liability, and that there was no reason not to extend
this to the civil remedy as well.97 The court went on to conclude
that plaintiffs’ allegations established a claim under either an
aiding and abetting theory or a conspiracy theory, and that,
were they to prove at trial that the victims were killed by
terrorists who were enrolled in the benefit plan, such proof
would be sufficient to prevail on either theory.98
Other courts similarly embraced the Boim I secondary
liability holding. In Wutz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, a victim
of an attack by a Palestinian terrorist group sued the Bank of
China in the D.C. District Court, alleging that the Bank made
several wire transfers to the Palestinian group through its
leadership in Iran.99 Relying on the aiding and abetting liability
theory for the reasons set forth in Boim I, the court held that
the plaintiffs pled sufficient facts to state an aiding and
abetting claim against Bank of China. The court pointed to the
allegations that the Palestinian terrorist group carried out the
attacks that injured plaintiff, and that the Bank knowingly
provided them with material assistance.100
Similarly, in 2010, the District Court for the Southern
District of Florida recognized both the aiding and abetting
theory and conspiracy liability theory under § 2333. In Re
Chiquita Brands Intern, Inc., Alien Tort Statute and
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

Id. at 577.
Id.
Id. at 577, 582-83.
Id. at 583.
Id.
Id. at 585.
Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 18 (D.D.C. 2010).
Id. at 54-57.
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Shareholder Derivative Litigation involved five missionaries
who were kidnapped in 1993 and 1994 and eventually killed by
a Columbian terrorist group, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
de Colombia (FARC).101 Chiquita, an Ohio-based company
engaged in the production and distribution of bananas, made
numerous secret payments and smuggled weapons to FARC
from 1989 through 1997.102 Chiquita pled guilty in 2007 to
numerous violations of the criminal terrorism provisions.103
Following this guilty plea, families of the five victims brought suit
against Chiquita under both primary and secondary liability
theories.104 The court concluded that the plaintiffs pled sufficient
facts to establish a claim under the Halberstam test for aiding
and abetting liability,105 holding that Chiquita’s alleged monetary
donations and weapons smuggling qualified as “substantial
assistance.”106 Further, the court recognized civil conspiracy
liability under § 2333, and held that the plaintiffs’ allegations
stated a conspiracy claim as there were sufficient allegations as to
a common scheme between the two organizations.107
B.

Pushing Back against Secondary Liability

In 2012, another Hamas victim brought a claim against
Arab Bank in the Eastern District of New York.108 Mati Gill, a
dual American-Israeli citizen, was injured by a bullet fired from
the Gaza Strip, in an incident for which Hamas took credit.109 He
brought suit against Arab Bank, asserting claims under a
variety of statutes, including primary and secondary liability
under § 2333.110 The court first concluded that § 2333 does not
allow for civil aiding and abetting liability, relying on the rule
set out by the Supreme Court in Central Bank.111 The court
rejected the Boim I reasoning that § 2333 was distinguishable
from the statute in Central Bank because it involved an express
cause of action and because Congress intended to expand
liability beyond primary actors in the terrorism context.112 The
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112

In re Chiquita Brands Int’l, 690 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1301-02 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
Id. at 1302-03.
Id. at 1303.
Id. at 1309.
Id. at 1310; see also supra Part I.B.
Chiquita, 690 F. Supp. 2d at 1310-11.
Id. at 1311.
Gill v. Arab Bank PLC., 893 F. Supp. 2d 474, 479 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
Id.
Id. at 479-80.
Id. at 481.
Id. at 499-500.
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court concluded that Central Bank was not intended to be
limited to implied rights of action, and that the issue of
whether Congress intended to extend liability to secondary
actors is irrelevant in light of the Central Bank rule, since
Congress did not explicitly make such a distinction in the
statute.113 However, the court recognized the primary liability
through incorporation theory described in Boim I.114
Additionally, the court set out the specific elements a plaintiff
would need to prove to succeed on such a claim. According to
the court, the primary liability through an incorporation claim
had three elements: wrongful act, mental state, and
causation.115 That is, first, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant violated the acts and satisfied the mental state
described in the specific material support criminal provision.116
Second, the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s actions
proximately caused his or her injuries.117
The Second Circuit eventually weighed in, agreeing
with the Eastern District that § 2333 did not allow aiding and
abetting liability but did allow for primary liability for material
supporters through incorporation. In Rothstein v. UBS AG, the
plaintiffs, injured in a series of rocket attacks in Israel, allegedly
carried out by Hamas and Hezbollah, sued UBS, a Swiss bank
with offices throughout the U.S.118 According to plaintiffs, UBS
provided financial services and other forms of support to Iran,
which in turn provided various forms of material support,
including large amounts of money, to Hamas and Hezbollah.119
Through this alleged chain of support, the plaintiffs sought to
hold UBS primarily and secondarily liable under § 2333 for their
injuries.120 In affirming the district court’s decision to grant
defendant’s motion to dismiss, the Second Circuit first held that
§ 2333 does not allow for aiding and abetting liability in light of
the Central Bank holding.121 The court then went on to
recognize the primary liability through incorporation theory
but affirmed the dismissal nonetheless because the plaintiffs
had failed to plead sufficient facts, specifically as to the

113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121

Id.
Id. at 502.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 84-85, 87 (2d Cir. 2013).
Id. at 84-85.
Id. at 88.
Id. at 97.
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connection between Iran and the terrorist groups, to plausibly
show that UBS proximately caused their injuries.122
As demonstrated above, courts and scholars have taken
§ 2333 to two extremes. On the one end is Geoffrey Sant, who
contends that civil actions should be limited to those directly
involved in carrying out the terrorist attack that caused a
particular plaintiff’s injuries. On the other end is Boim III,
which would conceivably attach civil liability to anyone who
knowingly or even recklessly provided money, services,
encouragement, or other support to the terrorist group
responsible for the plaintiff’s injuries. The proper approach to
these contending positions lies somewhere in between.
III.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, PLAIN LANGUAGE, AND POLICY
SUPPORT EXTENDING LIABILITY BEYOND THOSE
DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE ATTACK

A.

Legislative History

The legislative history of § 2333 indicates that Congress
intended the provision to be read broadly. The language of the
statute was left intentionally broad, and it was passed as part
of Congress’s effort to expand the scope of its fight against
terrorism and provide victims with a remedy.
A 1992 report from the House Judiciary Committee
regarding the adoption of § 2333 notes that, “The recent case of
the Klinghoffer family is an example of this gap in our efforts
to develop a comprehensive legal response to international
terrorism.”123 The Klinghoffer case involved a family left
without a legal remedy and a group of individuals that were
not held accountable for their actions due to jurisdictional
limitations. In emphasizing its desire for § 2333 to be a
comprehensive response to this gap, Congress indicates its
intent for § 2333 to be read as broadly as possible as a way to
eliminate the previous inequities.
The Senate Judiciary Committee Report also highlights
the expansive nature of the legislation. It notes that,
[Section 2333] would allow the law to catch up with contemporary
reality by providing victims of terrorism with a remedy for a wrong
that, by its nature, falls outside the usual jurisdictional categories of
wrongs that national legal systems have traditionally addressed. By

122
123

Id.
H.R. REP. 102-1040, at 5 (1992) (emphasis added).
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its provisions for compensatory damages, tremble [sic] damages, and
the imposition of liability at any point along the causal chain of
terrorism, it would interrupt, or at least imperil, the flow of money.124

This passage reflects the evolving understanding in the fight
against terrorism. Terrorist groups, unlike other bad actors,
are virtually impossible to attack directly through the courts.
Instead, these groups can be significantly deterred by securing
judgments against the entities that provide them money and
supplies. In recognizing that § 2333 was a key part of this new
fight against terrorism, Congress clearly intended the statute
would extend to these financial supporters of terrorism.
Further Congressional testimony provides additional
insight into the broad and comprehensive intent of the
legislators. In introducing the bill in 1991, Senator Charles
Grassley noted that,
[The Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) civil remedy] empowers victims with
all the weapons available in civil litigation, including: Subpoenas for
financial records, banking information, and shipping receipts—this
bill provides victims with the tools necessary to find terrorists’ assets
and seize them. The ATA accords victims of terrorism the remedies of
American tort law, including treble damages and attorney’s fees.125

Later, he stated that, “[o]ur resolve to fight terrorism and equip
victims with civil remedies for terrorist acts is as strong as
ever.”126 Moreover, in a subsequent hearing on the bill in 1992,
Senator Grassley stated, “While this bill will not permit civil
actions against sovereign leaders, it will allow the victims to
pursue renegade terrorist organization and their leaders, and go
after the resource that keeps them in business—their money.”127
Moreover, at a hearing on an earlier version of the ATA
civil remedy, Joseph Morris, a former Department of Justice
attorney testified that,
I think that the bill as drafted is powerfully broad, and its intention,
as I read it, is to bring focus on the problem of terrorism and,
reaching behind the terrorist actors to those who fund and guide and
harbor them, bring all of the substantive law of the American tort
law system.128

Finally, the specific order in which the material support
provisions were adopted shows Congress’s evolving and
124
125
126
127
128

S. REP. NO.102-342, at 22 (1992).
137 CONG. REC. S4511-04, 1991 WL 56141, at *1 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1991).
Id. at 2.
Gill v. Arab Bank PLC., 893 F. Supp. 2d 474, 496 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
Anti-Terrorism Hearing, supra note 14, at 136 (statement of Joseph A. Morris).
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expanding sense of how to pursue terrorist groups. In 1994, 18
U.S.C. § 2339A was passed, which criminalizes providing money
or other support to a terrorist group with the intention that the
support be used to further the terrorist activity.129 Section 2339B
followed in 1996 as a way to close the loophole created by 2339A;
it targeted individuals who give money to terrorist groups under
the guise of a charitable donation.130 This section criminalized
material support to terrorist groups regardless of whether the
person intended that the support would be used to facilitate
terrorist activity.131 Finally, 18 U.S.C. § 2339C, passed in 2006,
extends liability beyond donating money to the mere furnishing
of financial services.132 Together, these statutes show an
evolving understanding of how best to target and dismantle
terrorist groups and a continually expanding commitment to
pursue terrorist groups at all possible levels. The civil remedy
should be read in the context of Congress’s ever-evolving and
ever-expanding position regarding terrorist organizations.
Sant argues that the legislative history shows that
Congress intended the civil remedy to be a largely symbolic
provision that would only come into play on the rare occasion
when a terrorist group had attachable assets in the United
States.133 However, as noted above, the statute is broad by
design and should be read in the context of current
understanding. The individuals Sant quotes may not have
thought it practicable or possible to identify the source of
money behind terrorist groups and may have believed that a
symbolic defeat of a terrorist group would have a significant
impact. As recent years have shown, and as Congress’s
subsequent actions have revealed, the current understanding is
that the most effective, and possibly the only, way to go after
terrorist groups is by attacking the source of their funding.
B.

Statutory Language

The plain language of the statute further supports an
expansive view that includes financial institutions.

129
130
131
132
133

18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2012).
Id. § 2339B.
Id.
Id. § 2339C.
See Sant, supra note 7, at 540-43.
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1. “International Terrorism”
One of Sant’s principal arguments is that Congress
could not have intended to extend liability to financiers because
the term “international terrorism,” defined as activities that
“involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life,” does not
include donating money or providing financial services.134 As
argued in Boim III, giving money to a known terrorist group is
an act dangerous to human life in the same way as giving a gun
to a child.135 Notably, the definition of international terrorism
does not include a requirement that the conduct be intentional
or even knowing.136 Boim III and the courts that have followed
its course have all concluded that negligent conduct will not
satisfy the statute, as treble damages are generally not available
for mere negligence.137 However, if recklessness is sufficient, as
Boim III and others have advocated, the knowing provision of
support to a terrorist group such as Hamas clearly qualifies.
The Restatement of Torts defines recklessness as
engaging in an activity “knowing or having reason to know of
facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only
that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm
to another, but also that such risk is substantially greater than
that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.”138
Further, in contrasting recklessness from negligence, the
Restatement explains:
“[N]egligence” excludes conduct which the actor does or should
realize as involving a risk to others which is not merely in excess of
its utility, but which is out of all proportion thereto and is therefore
“recklessly disregardful of the interests of others.” As the
disproportion between risk and utility increases, there enters into
the actor’s conduct a degree of culpability which approaches and
finally becomes indistinguishable from that which is shown by
conduct intended to invade similar interests. Therefore, where this
disproportion is great, there is a marked tendency to give the
conduct a legal effect closely analogous to that given conduct which
is intended to cause the resulting harm.139

This language generally tracks the language in the
international terrorism definition, and indicates a level of
culpability that is consistent with a punitive, treble damages
134
135
136
137
138
139

Id. at 537.
See supra Part I.C.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2331.
See Gill v. Arab Bank PLC., 893 F. Supp. 2d 474, 497 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965).
Id. § 282.
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civil remedy. Further, it is clear that knowingly providing
support to a terrorist group satisfies this requirement. Though
the utility of providing support to a terrorist group, assuming
the group also engages in positive, humanitarian efforts, could
conceivably be relatively high, the magnitude of risk is still
sufficiently exorbitant to qualify as reckless. Magnitude of risk
involves both probability and scope of potential harm.140 For a
group such as Hamas, which has engaged in numerous attacks
over a long period and has expressly stated a desire to
eradicate an entire group of people,141 the probability that the
group will use the support to facilitate an attack that will
injure people like David in Boim I is very high, at least as great
as the probability that a child provided with a loaded gun will
cause harm to himself or another. Further, the scope of
potential harm is astronomical, as Hamas and other terrorist
groups generally target areas with large groups of victims to
ensure maximum impact.142
That Congress viewed the provision of support to
terrorist groups as an “act dangerous to human life” is further
supported by the fact that Congress later criminalized this very
activity, alongside other activities, such as hijacking an
airplane, that are traditionally thought to be acts dangerous to
human life.143 Moreover, the fact that the statute specifically
says “involve violent acts” rather than just “violent acts,”
suggesting that Congress intended to expand liability to acts
that, while not inherently violent, contribute to the overall
violence of the terrorist attack.144
2. Other Language
Further, other language in the statute supports an
expansive view. The fact that Congress created a civil cause of
action without expressly stating the elements of such a cause of
action suggests that they intended for the claim to include the
general elements and principles of tort liability.145

Id.
See Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. (Boim III), 549 F.3d 685,
694 (7th Cir. 2008) (describing Hamas as “gunning for Israelis”).
142 See Gill, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 485.
143 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(A) (2012).
144 Id.; Gill, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 482 (quoting from Section 2331 and
emphasizing the statute’s use of the word “involve”).
145 See Gill, 893 F. Supp. at 522.
140
141
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Further, the House report contains sections on
limitations to the civil cause of action.146 One such express
limitation is that a plaintiff may not bring suit, or may be
limited in discovery if the Attorney General determines it will
impair a corresponding criminal action.147 Another is that a
plaintiff may not sue for injuries arising out of an act of war.148
There is no mention on any limitation to the class of people to
which a plaintiff may sue.
3. Policy
There are two primary policy justifications for providing
a civil remedy to victims of terror. The first is providing the
victim with justice and relief.149 The second is punishing and
hopefully hindering or even incapacitating terrorist groups in
order to prevent future attacks.150 Both of these policy goals are
furthered by expanding liability beyond the principal terrorist
actors to those who provide the actors with support.
The first way in which these policy goals are furthered
is that given the lower standard of proof and expanded
discovery, civil trials are more likely to lead to findings of
liability than criminal trials.151 Thus, as a general matter, the
more people involved with terrorism that a victim may sue, the
greater the remedy to the victim and the stronger the penalty
to the terrorist. This is particularly true when dealing with
banks, where the expanded discovery afforded in civil cases
allows plaintiffs to get past bank secrecy laws that may pose a
greater barrier in criminal cases.152
The second way these policy goals are furthered is that,
terrorist groups are exceedingly hard to sue civilly, or even
criminally, for a number of reasons: they are intentionally
covert; they rarely have any contact in the United States; and
they often have few assets, certainly not enough to satisfy a
judgment following a large attack.153 Thus, a potential plaintiff
would face numerous obstacles, and likely an eventual dead
H.R. REP. NO. 102-1040, at 3 (1992).
Id.
148 Id.
149 See id. at 4.
150 See generally Anti-Terrorism Act Hearing.
151 John F. Murphy, Civil Litigation Against Terrorists and the Sponsors of
Terrorism: Problems and Prospects, 28 REV. LITIG. 315, 315-16 (2008).
152 See Sant, supra note 7, at 562.
153 Id. at 546; see also Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. (Boim III),
549 F.3d 685, 691(7th Cir. 2008).
146

147
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end, in trying to sue a foreign terrorist group in an American
court. Though § 2333 gives the courts subject matter
jurisdiction, it is unlikely a plaintiff would be able to establish
that a group such as a Hamas would have sufficient contacts
with the United States for personal jurisdiction.154 ?Even in the
exceedingly rare case where a terrorist group had contacts in
the U.S. and was brought to the U.S. to stand trial, it is likely
the group would have only minimal attachable assets in the
U.S., certainly not enough to satisfy a wrongful death action.155
These issues are all illustrated in cases such as Klinghoffer and
many others. The financial supporters of terrorist groups, on
the other hand, are often large businesses with substantial
assets and sufficient contacts in the United States to establish
personal jurisdiction.156
Indeed, Sant concedes that were the civil remedy
limited to the terrorist actors, suits would be rare and
monetary awards almost non-existent. Though Sant contends
that this was Congress’s intent, it seems counterintuitive that
Congress would create a remedy that actually did not provide
any real remedy. Rather, it is more likely, especially in the
context of the vigorous fight against terrorism, that Congress
would intend that the remedy reach as far as the courts were
willing to allow it, so as to most effectively achieve its twin
goals of fighting terrorists and compensating victims.
IV.

PROXIMATE CAUSE IS PROPER LIMITATION ON CIVIL
LIABILITY

Given the strong considerations supporting the expansion
of civil liability to include supporters of terrorism, it is not
surprising that most courts dealing with § 2333 have recognized
the potential for claims against at least some class of material
supporters.157 However, even among these courts there is still
wide disagreement about where to draw the line. As seen in Part
I, some courts still allow claims premised on aiding and
abetting liability, which has no proximate cause requirement
and instead focuses on intent as the cutoff in liability.158 Other
See Murphy, supra note 151, at 323-24.
Id. at 327; Sant, supra note 7, at 546.
156 See Adam N. Schupack, The Arab Israeli Conflict and Civil Litigation
Against Terrorism, 60 DUKE L.J. 207, 238 (2010).
157 See Gill v. Arab Bank PLC., 893 F. Supp. 2d 474, 497-502 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)
(discussing different courts’ approaches).
158 See supra Part I.
154
155
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courts have focused on the claims as ones of primary liability,
and thus have used proximate cause, rather than intent, as the
cutoff. As will be discussed below, proximate cause provides the
most useful cutoff for these claims, as it not only incorporates
intent but addresses the primary concerns voiced by those who
worry about extending liability too far.
A.

Secondary Liability is Too Expansive

Aside from the issue that secondary liability might not
even be available under § 2333 due to Central Bank, its
reliance on intent as a cutoff on liability is inadequate. The
initial summary judgment ruling against HLF in Boim I is
illustrative of the problem. After ruling that aiding and
abetting liability was available and dismissing HLF’s motion to
dismiss, the district judge noted that under such a theory, the
Boims could prevail if they proved that HLF knowingly
provided material support to Hamas.159 In 2001, the Treasury
Department pursuant to an executive order seized HLF’s assets
following an investigation that revealed it had ties to Hamas.160
HLF challenged its designation as a terrorist group in federal
court, and the decision was upheld by a district court and
affirmed by the D.C. Circuit in 2003.161 The D.C. Circuit recounted
the district courts summary of the administrative record, which
described HLF’s ties to Hamas in general terms, such as “HLF
has had financial connections to Hamas since its creation in
1989,” and “FBI informants reliably reported that HLF funds
Hamas.”162 The Boims then moved for summary judgment against
HLF, arguing that through collateral estoppel, there was no issue
of material fact as to one required element, namely that HLF
knowingly provided material support to Hamas.163 The district
court agreed and granted summary judgment.164
The district court never even addressed the connection
between HLF’s alleged monetary donations and the attack that
killed David Boim. David Boim was killed in 1996. The Treasury
Departments report explains only that HLF had economic ties to
Hamas as far back as 1989. It does not detail any specific
Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. (Boim I), 291 F.3d 1000, 1015 (7th Cir. 2002).
Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. (Boim III), 549 F.3d 685, 701
(7th Cir. 2008).
161 Id.
162 Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 340 F. Supp. 2d 885, 902 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
163 Id.
164 Boim III, 549 F.3d at 705.
159

160
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donations or whether the donations were made to particular
segment of Hamas. Such general allegations of long-term
financial ties may be sufficient for a seizure of assets or a
criminal conviction, but there must be some further information
that it some way ties to HLF’s donation to the attack that killed
David Boim. This evidence may consist of specific donations
close in time to the 1996 donation, a substantially large donation
made to the terrorist arm of Hamas, or even some evidence
indicating that at the time HLF made its donations in the early
90s, the first years of Hamas’ existence, they knew or had reason
to know Hamas was engaged in carrying out attacks against
civilians. Under the aiding and abetting framework used by the
Boim district court, if HLF today severed all ties with Hamas
and never made another donation to them, they could
nonetheless conceivably be perpetually liable to any victim of a
future Hamas attack. Thus, without making some effort to tie
the defendant’s support to the plaintiff’s particular injuries,
the potential scope of § 2333 liability is too expansive.
B.

Cause in Fact is Too Limiting

On the other hand, requiring the plaintiffs to show that
their injury would not have occurred but for the defendant’s
support is equally problematic as this would effectively
preclude claims against any supporters. One basic problem
with requiring but for cause in these cases is the issue of proof.
With so many streams of money and supplies being funneled to
terrorist groups, it would be virtually impossible for plaintiffs
to isolate a particular donation as being involved in the
commission of the attack that caused their injuries. Another
fundamental issue with applying cause in fact to these cases is
the problem of the fungibility of money.165 A group like Hamas
conceivably has numerous sources of support and substantial
money in its reserve. Thus, were a particular group, such as
HLF, to decide to withhold its donation, Hamas could move
money that was allotted for another project in order to make up
this shortfall and fund its next attack. In this sense, HLF’s
monetary support cannot be said to be a but for cause of any
particular Hamas attack.

165

Id. at 698.
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Some courts have recognized this issue and decided to apply a
“substantial factor” test instead.166 This is the proper approach. To
do otherwise would leave most victims without a remedy and
effectively insulate terrorist groups and their financiers from
liability. While it is impossible to prove that a particular donation
caused a particular attack, it is undeniable that any significant
provision of support to a terrorist group will substantially facilitate
future attacks. The substantial factor test will encompass these
significant donations that, though they cannot be tied directly to a
particular attack, clearly played a role in bringing about the attack.
Proximate cause presents the best cutoff for liability.

Proximate cause provides the best cutoff for liability in
these cases. Two characteristics of proximate cause make it
particular useful as a cutoff for liability. First, because proximate
cause is an abstract, legal concept, rather than a logical one, it is
able to incorporate many considerations, including mental state
and timing. While, as discussed above, mental state by itself does
not provide a suitable measure of liability in these cases, it weighs
heavily in the ultimate determination, and proximate cause
allows mental state to be considered in context along with other
important factors. Relatedly, as will be discussed further below,
factors such as mental state and timing are codependent. A
donation made to Hamas intending to support its terrorist
activities may lead to liability further into the future than a
donation made recklessly. Proximate cause takes all of these
considerations into account.
Second, proximate cause’s focus on foreseeability and
intervening cause both usefully track culpability in this context
and protect against the two main concerns associated with
§ 2333 liability. Under traditional proximate cause formulations,
an actor only faces liability for actions that are reasonably
foreseeable results of the action.167 Similarly, an intervening act
cuts off liability where it is not foreseeable.168 The first concern
with § 2333 is that civil liability could be extended to a
potentially endless class of groups and individuals that provide
even the most remote support to a terrorist group. An example
discussed in the Boim III dissent is the political group that has a
member of Hamas speak at its convention. In the abstract, it
does not seem reasonably foreseeable that inviting a Hamas
member to speak will result in a Hamas attack. Thus, the
166 See e.g. id.; see also Gill v. Arab Bank PLC., 893 F. Supp. 2d 474, 507
(E.D.N.Y. 2012).
167 Jim Gash, At The Intersection of Proximate Cause and Terrorism: A
Contextual Analysis of the Proposed Restatement of Torts, 91 KY. L.J. 523, 586 (2003).
168 Id.
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subsequent attack would be a superseding intervening cause
cutting off liability for the political group. On the other hand, it
is reasonably foreseeable in the abstract that a knowing
donation of money or weapons to Hamas will lead to an attack,
and thus a subsequent attack would rightfully not cut off
liability for these donors, who have provided Hamas with
material assistance and thus would and should be culpable.
The second main concern with extending § 2333 liability
to supporters is that it will lead to perpetual liability for all
future attacks conducted by the terrorist group. Again, this
concern is addressed by proximate cause. As discussed further
below, the greater the time period is between donation and
attack, the less foreseeable it is that the donation would lead to
such an attack. That is, it is foreseeable that a large donation
made to Hamas in 2013 will result in an attack in 2013 but not
in 2050. Where the line is ultimately drawn will be a case by
case decision, but the threat of perpetual liability is eliminated.
C.

Proximate Cause Model

Having determined that proximate cause provides the
most useful cutoff in these cases, the final question is what the
test for proximate cause will be in these cases. Courts have
taken many different approaches. As seen above, Boim III
essentially concludes that any provision of support to a
terrorist group, if made at least recklessly, would satisfy
proximate cause.169 The dissent in Boim III criticized this
approach as too expansive, as have other courts.170 The Second
Circuit has not provided much guidance, concluding only that a
showing of proximate cause requires more than the “fairly
traceable” standard used to determine standing.171
The Eastern District of New York in Gill has come the
closest to providing a workable framework for determining
proximate cause in these cases. Unlike Boim III, which turns
proximate cause into a yes-no question, the court in Gill treats
proximate cause essentially as a sliding scale with multiple
factors, including mental state, timing, and nature of donation.
Thus, the court concludes, “[A] major recent contribution with a
malign state of mind would—and should—be enough . . . . But
a small contribution made long before the event—even if
See generally Boim III, 549 F.3d at 695-700.
Id. at 711-12 (Rovner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Abecassis v. Wyatt, 785 F. Supp. 2d 614, 645 (S.D. Tex. 2011).
171 Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 92 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
169
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recklessly made—would not be. The concept of proximate cause
is central in imposing a balance.”172
1. Mental State
Mental state is perhaps the most important, and also
most complex, factor in this formulation. Not only must the
court determine what level of mental state to require, but it
must also determine which facts to apply the mental state to.
For example, in Gill, the court concluded that the defendant
must be at least reckless not only to the fact that the group to
which it made donations was engaged in terrorist activities but
also that it targeted Americans.173 On the other hand, a Texas
district court recently concluded that recklessness was not
sufficient, holding that defendant must know or intend both of
these elements.174
Requiring recklessness in these cases makes more
sense, as proving knowledge or intent would be exceedingly
difficult and place an undue burden on plaintiffs. Many
terrorist groups are large organizations with many branches
and fronts that carry out non-violent humanitarian activities in
addition to its terrorist activities. As such, it would be very
difficult, if not impossible, to prove that a defendant who
provided support to a front or earmarked its support for
humanitarian efforts actually knew or intended that this
support would be used to facilitate terrorist activity. This
concern was voiced by the dissent in Boim III.175 However, as
the majority in Boim III reasoned, the violent nature of Hamas
and other terrorist groups are so notorious that any donation,
even if made with innocent intent, is a dangerous activity.176 It
was exactly this thinking that led Congress to pass § 2339B in
order to supplement § 2339A in the material support criminal
provisions. Section 2339A criminalizes material support made
with the intent to further terrorist activities, thus allowing a
donor to escape liability by earmarking its donation for
humanitarian purposes.177 Section 2339B closed this loophole

Gill v. Arab Bank PLC., 893 F. Supp. 2d 474, 507 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
Id. at 506.
174 Abecassis, 785 F. Supp. 2d at 635-36.
175 Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. (Boim III), 549 F.3d 685, 706
(7th Cir. 2008) (Rovner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
176 See id. at 698.
177 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2012).
172
173
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by holding a donor liable so long for any donation made to a
designated terrorist group, regardless of the donor’s intent.178
2. Time
The second important factor is time. As discussed above,
a principal concern of the detractors is potentially perpetual,
ruinous liability. It is generally not reasonably foreseeable that
a donation will result in an attack 20 years down the line.
Rather than setting a fixed cutoff, the question of temporal
proximity will be a fact-specific and case-by-case question. It
will also be dependent on the other two factors in the analysis.
Thus, where an individual makes a large donation to a known
terrorist group, it is reasonably foreseeable that the donation
will facilitate attacks further into the future than a small
donation made to a relatively unknown group.
3. Nature of Support
The final factor in the analysis is the nature,
particularly the size, of the support. It is foreseeable that a
large monetary donation will facilitate terrorist activity,
whereas with a small donation or verbal support, it is not
reasonably foreseeable. For example, it is not necessarily
reasonably foreseeable that a five dollar donation to Hamas
will result in an imminent attack. Conversely, it is highly
foreseeable that continuously funneling large amounts of
money will facilitate an attack.
The result of these factors is a sliding scale and balancing
test. Thus, on one end of the spectrum are large monetary
donations made to a well-known terrorist group within a short
time of the attack in question. On the other end are small
donations to unknown groups far removed from the attack that
injured plaintiff. In between, the court will engage in fact-specific
analysis using the three factors discussed above. This measured
approach will best ensure that victims are compensated and
terrorist are punished, while avoiding potentially ruinous liability
for marginally involved third parties.

178

Id. § 2339B.
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CONCLUSION
Since September 11, 2001, the United States has
engaged in many, largely reactive measures designed to
prevent the next terrorist attack. The civil remedy of § 2333
provides one of the more promising proactive avenues in the
fight against terrorism. By allowing citizens to secure
judgments against those who fund and supply terrorists, the
civil remedy could potentially have a real impact in
interrupting the terrorist groups’ activities, while also
providing victims with actual relief. In pursuit of these goals,
the courts should interpret § 2333 broadly, allowing claims
against those who materially support terrorist activity, so long
as there is sufficient proximate cause between the support and
the particular attack that injured the plaintiff. Through this
approach, the civil cause of action will provide an adequate
remedy to victims and bring those responsible to justice.
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